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The -hybrid‖ theory of war set forth in this document is the result of combining the best aspects of existing war theories with the unique influences of the current strategic environment to produce a refined theory of war for the modern international arena. The foundation of all war theories stems from four basic questions: What is war? Why and by whom are wars fought? What constitutes the nature, character and characteristics of war? How are wars won? This composition attempts to derive new answers to these questions through a careful analysis of classical and modern theorists alike, as measured against the harsh critique of history. The answers to these critical questions along with a dynamic evolution of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity form the greater concept of a -hybrid‖ theory of war, providing a more congruous application of ends, ways and means to 21st century warfare. While many of the examples used in this document correlate directly to U.S. interests, any state, nation, or party capable of war should find the immutable nature of these fundamental concepts intuitively relevant.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRINITY: A 21ST CENTURY -HYBRID‖ WAR THEORY
Whenever a theory appears as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve.
-Sir Karl Raimund Popper
Whether studying the classical teachings of Antoine Henri Jomini, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu, or the more modern theories of B. H. Liddell-Hart, Colin Gray and Edward Luttwak, an explicit and stand-alone application of any one of these theories to modern warfare is not readily discernable. All however, when measured against the informed distillation of historical lessons learned and the benefits of advanced technology can serve today's strategist in shaping a new and more fitting -hybrid‖ theory of war.
As the best grapes are harvested by the vintner to produce the finest wines, so too must the modern strategist decipher and select the best aspects of existing war theories to produce a refined theory of war for the modern international arena. The foundation of all war theories stems from four basic questions: What is war? Why and by whom are wars fought? What constitutes the nature, character and characteristics of war? How are wars won? This composition attempts to derive new answers to these questions through a careful analysis of classical and modern theorists alike, as measured against the harsh critique of history. The answers to these critical questions along with a dynamic evolution of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity form the greater concept of a -hybrid‖ theory of war, providing a more congruous application of ends, ways and means to 21st century warfare.
What is War?
There are a number of conflicting answers regarding this question and many fail to accurately account for the changing characteristics of conflicts in the world, particularly when it comes to non-state actors. The term -war‖ has many meanings which can detract from its strategic significance (war of words, war against illiteracy, war on drugs, etc.). This paper avoids those distractions by focusing specifically on armed conflict at the strategic level.
The legal definition of war is: a contention by force; or the art of paralyzing the forces of an enemy…civil (between two parties of the same state or nation) or national (between two or more independent nations).
2 Merriam-Webster further defines war as a state of open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations. 3 These definitions, however, fall short of addressing the issue of conflict involving non-state actors, a very real concern in the current strategic environment.
In comparing the classical theorists: Jomini, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, while all three were in relative agreement as to the fundamental issues of war, each had very different perspectives on what defines war. Sun Tzu believed that war was the application of armed force to gain victory. 4 Clausewitz viewed war as -an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will,‖ 5 but also viewed war as but a stronger form of diplomacy. 6 Jomini clearly defines the importance of the six principles of the art of war (statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, and minor tactics), but
gives no readily apparent definition of war itself. 7 Of the more modern theorists, LiddellHart views war as the art of applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy; 8 Gray defines war as organized violence threatened or waged for political purposes; 9 and
Luttwak believes that war is both the act of attrition through the application of superior fire power and material strength to destroy the enemy's force, and the act of relational maneuver to incapacitate the enemy's systems. 10 Although the environment that influenced the classical theorists differs greatly from that of the modern strategist, many of the basic philosophical concepts still apply.
In order to frame their credence in today's environment, these enduring concepts of classical theory must be viewed through the modern lens of increased technology with a respect for the emerging trend towards asymmetrical conflict with non-state actors, as opposed to large scale conventional warfare. In this area, Jomini was particularly apropos in his view that superior armament, while a great element of success, is not the deciding factor in battle. 11 While the advent of nuclear weapons, aircraft, cyber networks and space systems have had a noticeable impact on the ways in which wars are fought, they have done little to change the essence of what defines war. Consequently, their impact will be addressed in a later section of this work.
Politics is defined as competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership. 12 Despite the variances in the definitions of war previously mentioned, all share a common link to strategy and policy. Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart and Gray state it specifically in their references to diplomacy, policy and politics. Further review of the other theorists also reveals ties to strategy and policy. Sun
Tzu with his dictum: -If not in the interests of the state, do not act,‖ 13 Jomini in his view that a statesmen concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable and determines the operations necessary to attain the object of war, 14 and Luttwak with his belief that the interactions at the military levels yield final results within the broad setting of international politics. 15 War, in its basic sense, is therefore defined as the strategic application of organized violence to achieve political ends. In determining a threshold for war, it is vitally important that strategic planners and advisors understand and adhere to the documents intended to provide strategic direction, for it is this direction that serves as the common thread in integrating and synchronizing the activities of strategic planners, 24 and informing the world view and key decisions of strategic leaders. Arguably, non-state actors will not be coupled to such a capacious collection of documents, but their world view will be shaped by other less formal documents, sometimes religiously based, that will carry no less legitimacy in their eyes.
The primary governing documents for the U.S. include: the National Security Strategy (NSS); the National Defense Strategy (NDS); the National Military Strategy (NMS); and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 25 All four documents are essential in building a foundation on which to frame U.S. strategic decisions and recommendations. They ensure both are indelibly linked to national interests, particularly when it comes to rationalizing the use of force. This is where the decision to go to war must be inextricably linked with strategy and policy.
The NSS is the driving document for U.S. national security policy and serves to define the political ends (objectives) that must be met, based on four enduring core interests. 26 The document also highlights the dramatic influence that non-state actors will continue to have on the world around them as economic growth creates new centers of influence and more nations assert themselves regionally and globally. 27 This is further supported by the view that states with weak, failing, and corrupt governments will increasingly be used as safe havens for an expanding array of non-state actors that will breed conflict and endanger stability as stated in the NMS. 28 The NDS, NMS, and QDR, are supporting documents for the NSS, and define the strategic ways (concepts) that each echelon utilizes to link their focus of effort back to the NSS. The strategic ways describe the strategic approach to achieving the desired ends. 29 The NDS defines five key objectives to support the NSS 30 and the NMS, in turn, establishes four supporting military objectives. 31 The QDR adds to the NDS by providing additional direction to the Department of Defense (DoD) through a long-term (next twenty years) projection of the ways DoD needs to progress in order to remain relevant to meeting the challenges of current and future environments. 32 Additionally, the QDR identifies ten key defense priorities and highlights how atypical threats ranging from non-state terrorist groups to large state competitors will look to exploit holes in U.S.
defenses through unconventional means.
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Like the concepts defined in the NDS, NMS, and QDR, the use of organized violence is one of many ways to achieve political ends and the employment of military forces is the resource (means) to achieve those ends. The means however, are more than simply tangible resources, such as military forces, military technology, and available financing. Also included, are intangible resources, such as cultural appeal, goodwill from previous activities, and the competence, knowledge and abilities of the military forces being employed.
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Cultural awareness and an incisive cognition of the adversaries' interests are additional factors that must always be measured as key elements of the equation. A working knowledge of basic cultural traits (our own and others) minimizes unpleasant surprises; provides insights in advance and enables successful strategy interaction. 35 The U.S. consistently fails to understand others because of -cultural black holes,‖ core beliefs of such gravity that they cannot be questioned, which prohibit intelligent or perceptive analysis of others' cultures and agendas. 36 This often creates undesired perceptions which, unchecked, can compel an adversary to choose violence over other, less severe, forms of conflict resolution. While understanding the adversaries' point of view may not ultimately change the decision to go to war, it certainly assists in informing a plan that is better suited for success should that decision be made.
Selecting the best ways and means to achieve the political ends is a wicked problem that rests squarely on the shoulders of strategic planners and advisors. This selection must be devoid of emotion and adeptly balanced across national interests, alliances, cultural influences and public views. When measured against all potential strategic options, if force is deemed the most efficacious or only way to achieve the desired ends, the appropriate level of force must then be selected from the total Range of Military Operations (ROMO) to achieve the desired strategic effect. This can extend from military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence activities up through major operations and campaigns. 37 For any state, nation, or party, when core interests are in jeopardy and other means of deterrence prove ineffective in protecting those interests, the threshold for war has been crossed and the only remaining alternative is the use of force. Thus, wars are fought when honor and interests are threatened, the threshold of fear is exceeded and other forms of diplomacy are incapable of countering that threat.
What Constitutes the Nature, Character and Characteristics of War?
The answer to this question is a little more complex by virtue of the many elements that influence and characterize war. While the character and characteristics of war will inevitably change over time, the nature of war in perpetual and its most basic element is violence. When the decision is made that war is the only way to achieve the desired political ends, then combat forces (means) must apply violence with the utmost resolve and in the appropriate capacity to decisively meet the desired intent. This is Whether studying the wars of Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, this complexity is readily apparent in the unexpected difficulties faced during these epic conflicts. At the root of this complexity is the fact that, in war, we are fighting a real enemy that must always be kept in mind, 44 an enemy that is adaptive and actively working to counter our every move in order to achieve his desired political ends.
The character of warfare can be limited or total, conventional or asymmetrical, nuclear, civil, or guerilla, but irrespective of the title, complexity and violence serve as the common thread that interweaves them all. Future wars will include both change and continuity from the past, which will inevitably reshape the character of war over time. 45 This adaptive process has produced a trend of warfare more in line with Sun Tzu's indirect approach, consistently limited in scope, with non-state actors such as guerilla forces and terrorist groups using asymmetrical warfare against larger state actors.
Limited war is not a new concept; during the nuclear arms race of the Cold War it was essential in providing potential military options short of the total destruction of civilizations. While the arms race with the former Soviet Union has subsided, the possibility of nuclear war remains a legitimate concern. Potential rogue nations like concern.
-Total Wars,‖ such as the Napoleonic and World Wars, involved entire nations.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, no single state possess the conventional equipment, change. The challenge lies in trying to accurately predict the outcome of that change over time and prudently prepare for a future about which nothing is known in reliable detail. 47 As a result, capabilities must be developed so that they are sufficiently adaptable to cope with a range of security challenges. 48 Although the inevitable maturing of national interests makes a future conventional conflict between major powers possible, such a conflict is arguably unlikely because the money and resources required to fight a major theater war would devastate the economic growth that rising powers like India and China have worked so hard to achieve. The Chinese government alone estimates that it needs to grow at a rate of 8% per annum to avoid excess unemployment and social unrest, 49 a rate of growth that would be impossible to achieve in the shadows of a major conflict. While this will likely drive China to think hard about the economic impact of a decision to use force, it will certainly not prevent that option if its core interests, such as the ability to grow at the required rate, are perceived to be in jeopardy. 62 If coalition forces had failed to apply this adaptive approach in Iraq, the outcome of the war could have been far worse, and the cost in blood and treasure far greater.
How are Wars Won?
The intuitive response to this question is -to destroy the enemy,‖ but this answer warrants further consideration. While the destruction of the enemy forces in a given battle may achieve a tactical victory, failure to tie these actions to the political ends can result in strategic failure. As previously mentioned, any use of force must be measured against the desired strategic effect. Based on the nature, character and characteristics of the war being fought, the destruction of enemy forces may not be the desired strategic goal, as military victory does not automatically guarantee ultimate political victory. 63 Vietnam distinctly provides such an example, with the U.S. winning the majority of tactical engagements, but losing the greater war. The strategy in Vietnam was improvised rather than carefully designed, 64 with the administration vastly underestimating the enemy's capacity to resist, and not confronting the crucial question of what would be required to achieve its goals until it was bogged down in a bloody stalemate. 65 As a more recent example, the 1991 Gulf War proved that the decisive destruction of Saddam Hussein's military force, did not necessarily achieve the strategic effect the U.S. desired. 66 Ultimately, war is about compelling the enemy to do our will, but in the sense that we are able to achieve our political and strategic objectives through the successful translation of military victory into a political environment that is an improvement over what existed before the use of force. 67 Gray further captures this theory with his statement that -in war one is fighting for peace, not just any peace, but a peace that makes the war worthwhile…as peace of one kind or another must follow war, so war must follow peace.‖ 68 The goal may be, as Liddell-Hart put it, -to simply achieve a better state of peace,‖ 69 but this statement alone does not provide enough guidance with regard to political ends.
Clearly defining the political ends is essential to defining what victory should look
like and should always precede the decision to go to war. Clausewitz reinforces this with his emphasis on the imperativeness of not taking the first step without considering the last. 70 As discussed previously, war is complex, dynamic, and unpredictable. Because war is an extension of policy, the cultural influence on the people of the states, nations, and/or parties involved will inevitably contribute to shaping their final definition of victory.
There are always two sides to political will, ours and theirs, but the need for support in sustaining political will is abiding, as Sun Tzu astutely highlights in his recognition of national unity as an essential element of victory. 71 The U.S. has clearly seen in Vietnam, Somalia and Iraq, how a loss in public support can force a significant modification to the original idea of victory. Governments act on behalf of the communities they rule or govern, and no matter how authoritarian the system of government, political leaders must be attentive to the sentiments most popular in their society. 72 The will of the people and the adaptive requirements of modern warfare often require political ends to be adjusted throughout the period of conflict as the other elements of the D.I.M.E. add to or detract from the complexity of the problem. These revisions to the end state will inevitably change the conditions for victory. 73 War on any scale, extols a heavy price of blood and resources. Because of this tremendous tax on the use of force, the political ends required to define victory must not only be clear, they must be reasonably achievable as well. Since war is not an act of senseless passion, but is controlled by its political objectives, the value of those objectives must determine the sacrifices to be made in both magnitude and duration. 74 Clausewitz said, -no one in his senses ought to start a war without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it, the former being its political purpose and the latter its operational objective.‖ 75 Without clearly defined political ends and the reasonable means to achieve them, the prospect of a protracted war is irrefutable and, as Sun Tzu proclaimed, no country has ever benefitted from a protracted war. 76 The cost of our conflicts in Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan and their impact on unity and political will are palpable examples. Where Sun Tzu's proclamation falls short is in its underestimation of the benefits of a protracted war for non-state actors seeking to inflict a cost burden, in terms of blood and treasure, on a more powerful and resourceful adversary.
Ideally, wars are won when the political ends are met, but achieving the political ends for one adversary usually means failing to achieve them for another, with the defeated state often considering the outcome merely transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. 77 In the end, if the above contributors make the prospect of achieving a political victory untenable, then LiddellHart's goal of simply achieving a better state of peace (at least from our own point of view) may be the -least worst‖ option under the circumstances. Iraq, as an example, has not produced the type of western democracy originally envisioned, but its emerging form of democracy, if sustained, will likely create more stability than the regime it replaced.
The Role of Technology in Shaping the Characteristics War
Applying these fundamental concepts in the 21st century must also take into account the sophisticated byproducts of technology. From the advent of the aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine, to advances in aviation and the introduction of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), to space and cyberspace growth and relevance, all have had a notable impact on strategy and the characteristics of war, but have not changed the basic nature of war. While technological breakthroughs in information systems have significantly reduced the -fog of war,‖ the architecture of these systems has created a new vulnerability for the enemy to exploit through cyber attacks.
For those actors that can afford to modernize their military capabilities with the latest advances in technology, the increased effectiveness of precision stand-off weapons systems, improvements in manned and unmanned delivery platforms, and increased ability to project power can, in some cases, achieve strategic effect with far less risk to personnel. These same advances however, have driven less technologically progressive forces to new and innovative approaches to counter the immensity and sophistication of the conventional power associated with major state actors, The previously outlined analysis of classical and contemporary war theory in light of modern conditions drives a natural evolution of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, particularly because of a dynamic shift away from the traditional attrition warfare of Clausewitz's era. Today, the empowerment of smaller non-state actors versus larger conventional forces, is causing attrition warfare, in which the objective is the destruction of enemy forces, to evolve into exhaustion warfare, in which the lesser capable force seeks to protract the conflict so that the cost in blood and resources exceeds the will of the larger force. This protractile approach to warfare inherently increases the influence the civilian population has on the political will that drives the outcome of a war. This not only gives the people more power in shaping the decisions of the governing authorities, and combatants involved, but also raises the importance of technology as a means of reducing civilian casualties through improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems and precision guided weapons.
The remarkable trinity, as defined by Clausewitz in On War, arguably has two interpretations. The first defines the three aspects of war as: 1) primordial violence (passion), hatred and enmity; 2) the play of chance and probability; and 3) its subjectivity to reason (rationality) as a subordinate element of national policy. The second simplifies these definitions into: 1) the people; 2) the commander and his army (military forces); and 3) the government. 83 While many argue that this later approach is an oversimplification of Clausewitz's intent, I believe that both views warrant consideration in framing a more modern version of the trinity for today's diverse strategic environment.
Although the people, the army (military), and the government form the foundation of the three aspects of the trinity, the more descriptive elements of the first interpretation show the inherent complexity and driving force behind the adaptivity that is a byproduct of modern unconventional warfare. Clausewitz did not equate passion, chance, and rationality with, respectively, the people, the army and the government, but he did assert the prominent connections between the three elements. 84 Through careful review of his reference to the trinity in On War, this is evident when he uses the word mostly in linking the application of the elements of the first interpretation to that of the second. 85 While passion primarily relates to the people and their will to support, condemn or remain indifferent to a conflict, it also influences the actions of government and military personnel. As a byproduct of near-real-time media coverage and advances in communications technology, passion is also much more prone to rapid, volatile fluctuations than in the past. Chance and probability, while primarily linked to military action, the dynamic and complex nature of war, and the role that courage and talent play in the commander and his army, also impact the politics of the government, or even the perception of the civilian population (people). Rationality, as a subject of policy, primarily relates to the government, but also influences the decision making of the people and the military. Therefore, the people, the military, and the government form the dominant aspects that influence war, but the characteristics that make up the complexities of warfare (passion, chance, and rationality), which are inherent in all forms of conflict, cannot be as stringently defined. Their influence will often transcend the lines of the dominant elements of the trinity. This inherently unstable relationship is a direct representation of the true nature of war. It is this change in the relationship of the elements that demands a new approach to account for the migration from attrition to exhaustion warfare, the rising involvement of non-state actors in war, the increased influence of the people on political will, and the increased volatility that is a byproduct of technological growth.
The Fire Triangle and the War Tetrahedron 
Conclusion
War in its basic sense, is defined as the strategic application of organized violence to achieve political ends. It is fought when honor and interests are threatened, the threshold of fear is exceeded and other forms of diplomacy are incapable of countering that threat. War is complex and has many levels. The human element of war only increases this complexity when coupled with the added influences of passion, culture, religion, chance, and rationality. War requires extreme violence, executed with the utmost resolve, but the degree of violence must be closely balanced against the desired strategic effect while continuing to evaluate the other elements of the D.I.M.E.
The goal in war (victory) is to achieve the desired political ends, which must be realistically attainable. If the -fog of war‖ precludes this end state, then as Liddell-Hart said, -a better form of peace‖ may be the best that can be achieved. As technology continues to advance, adversaries with limited resources will continue to find creative ways to counter these technological advances, and maintain the trend toward an unconventional exhaustion style of warfare. For nations with large conventional capabilities, this requires an adaptive approach to strategy. One that recognizes the inherent need for strategic pliancy by remaining poised for conventional forms of conflict with rising powers and potential coalitions, in addition to the threats presented by nonstate actors with less conventional forces.
The -hybrid‖ theory of war set forth in this document is the result of combining the best aspects of existing war theories with the unique influences of the current strategic environment to produce a refined theory of war for the modern international arena. 
